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Family involvement in the firm
A B S T R A C T
To address succession issues, the owners of family firms increasingly transfer their equity to family and chari-
table foundations, thereby creating so-called foundation-owned firms. This form of succession has become in-
creasingly common in various European countries. A small yet insightful stream of research has emerged
comparing the performance of foundation-owned firms against the performance of nonfoundation-owned firms.
Our study goes one step further and accounts for the heterogeneous nature of foundation-owned firms. We
investigate the role of foundation purpose (family versus charitable foundation), stock market listing, and family
involvement. Our results show that firms owned by a family foundation have better accounting performance
than firms owned by a charitable foundation. We further find a performance-enhancing effect of family in-
volvement in the firm’s management or supervisory board. Contrary to our expectations, we did not observe
significant performance differences between private and stock market-listed foundation-owned firms. Our study
advances the emergent stream of the foundation-owned (family) firm literature by integrating research on
foundation-owned firms with research on family firms. Furthermore, we contribute to the corporate governance
literature on ownership effects and blockholder ownership.
1. Introduction
The owners of family firms increasingly transfer their equity to
foundations, thereby creating so-called foundation-owned firms
(Draheim & Franke, 2018; Thomsen, 1999), instead of engaging in
traditional intrafamily succession. Such equity transfers are motivated
by manifold factors that include family-related (e.g., lack of successors
and avoidance of family conflicts), philanthropic, financial (tax opti-
mization), and corporate factors (e.g., desire for long-term planning due
to a stable ownership structure) or the founder’s personality (e.g., the
desire to set the company purpose for eternity and to continue shaping
the firm after one’s death) (Achleitner & Block, 2018; De Massis et al.,
2008). This form of succession is increasingly common in the DACH
region1 and in Scandinavian countries, leading to an increasing number
of foundation-owned firms in those countries (Fleisch et al., 2018). As
this article was written, several well-known firms, such as Aldi, Bosch,
Carlsberg, and Ikea, were partially or fully owned by foundations. Some
foundation-owned firms, such as those just listed, can still be classified
as family firms as the family continues to influence the company’s de-
velopment. Often, the founding family is the ultimate claimant of the
dividends of the foundation. In addition, despite having no direct equity
ownership (anymore), the family is sometimes still involved in the
management and control of the firm, leaving family members many
opportunities to shape the firms’ activities.
A small but growing body of literature has emerged around the
performance of foundation-owned firms, thereby mostly focusing on
accounting performance. These studies examine the performance dif-
ferences between foundation-owned firms and other types of firms
(Draheim & Franke, 2018; Dzansi, 2012; Herrmann & Franke, 2002;
Thomsen, 1996, 1999; Thomsen & Hansmann, 2014; Thomsen & Rose,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2020.100356
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2004). However, they provide ambiguous results. While some studies
(e.g., Herrmann & Franke, 2002) find that foundation-owned firms
outperform other types of firms, most studies do not find significant
performance differences (Dzansi, 2012; Thomsen, 1996; Thomsen &
Hansmann, 2014; Thomsen & Rose, 2004). We propose that these am-
biguous results stem from the heterogeneous nature of the group of
foundation-owned firms, which has thus far not been accounted for in
the literature on foundation-owned firms. For example, foundations as
firm owners can be either family or charitable foundations, which differ
substantially in their purpose and main characteristics. Charitable
foundations pursue charitable purposes and are partially managed by
individuals who do not possess the necessary entrepreneurial know-
how or motivation to effectively monitor the management of the firm
(Achleitner et al., 2018; Maier et al., 2016; Suarez, 2010). Family
foundations, in turn, primarily pursue the purpose of continued family
involvement, maintaining family wealth, and preserving the founder’s
will (Fleschutz, 2009). In such foundations, members of the founding
family are typically involved in the foundation’s board. We argue that
such involved family members typically show high levels of motivation
and expertise for effective corporate control. Other important sub-
groups of foundation-owned firms are those in which the founding fa-
mily is still involved in the firm’s management or supervisory board and
foundation-owned firms that are listed on the stock market (in contrast
to private ones). Depending on the type, the family remains more or less
connected and thus influences the foundation-owned firm.
This empirical study is phenomenon-driven and aims to determine
how the heterogeneous group of foundation-owned firms differs in
terms of accounting performance. Therefore, our particular focus is on
the role of the (founding) family. Our first research goal is to determine
whether there are performance differences between foundation-owned
firms owned by charitable foundations and those owned by family
foundations. Our second research goal is to determine whether a stock
market listing has a positive or negative effect on the performance of
foundation-owned firms. Third, we analyze whether the involvement of
the founding family either in the management or supervisory board of
the foundation-owned firm increases or decreases performance. We link
our theoretical arguments to agency theory.
Using a dataset of foundation-owned firms in Germany, we find, in
line with our theorizing, that foundation-owned firms owned by a fa-
mily foundation have better accounting performance than firms owned
by a charitable foundation. Our results further show that foundation-
owned firms, in which the founding family is involved in the firm
(management or supervisory board), perform better than foundation-
owned firms without such family involvement. Finally, our results show
that listed foundation-owned firms neither outperform nor underper-
form other foundation-owned firms.
Our study contributes to better understanding a specific type of
family firm that is steadily gaining practical and theoretical relevance:
those owned by a foundation. This study brings together research on
foundation-owned firms with research on family firms. We contribute
to two particular strands of the literature. First, our study contributes to
growing research on the performance of foundation-owned firms
(Achleitner et al., 2018; Draheim & Franke, 2018; Dzansi, 2012;
Herrmann & Franke, 2002; Thomsen, 1996, 1999; Thomsen & Rose,
2004). This literature has produced mixed results so far. We theorize
and show that foundation-owned firms as a group are very hetero-
geneous and that substantial performance differences exist within the
group of foundation-owned firms. In particular, the involvement of the
founding family in the firm as well as the choice of a family (as opposed
to charitable) foundation seems to make a difference for accounting
performance. By hand-collecting nuanced data about foundation-owned
firms and their potential dimensions of heterogeneity, we also make an
important empirical contribution as we dig deeply into what is cur-
rently an underinvestigated phenomenon. Most prior works have
treated foundation-owned firms as a homogeneous group and has ig-
nored the potential differences that may exist within this group of firms.
Second, our study contributes to research on the performance effects of
family involvement (Basco, 2013; Bennedsen et al., 2007; Block et al.,
2011; Miller et al., 2013; Sciascia et al., 2014). Prior research argues
that family managers are often characterized as having less managerial
talent than nonfamily managers (Burkart et al., 2003) and explains
their selection mainly through nepotism (Jaskiewicz et al., 2013;
Vinton, 1998), the importance of nonfinancial goals (Chrisman et al.,
2012), and possibly entrenchment and the exploitation of nonfamily
shareholders (Morck et al., 2005; Volpin, 2002), which, jointly, might
lead to the underperformance of family-managed firms. Our theorizing
and our results indicate that these arguments do not hold true for the
group of foundation-owned firms, where family involvement in the firm
seems to exert a performance-enhancing effect. In addition to con-
tributing to family firm research, our study contributes to the broader
corporate governance literature on ownership effects and blockholder
ownership (Morck et al., 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). We argue and
show that foundations as firm owners are not a homogenous group of
blockholders but that in particular, charitable and family foundations
comprise different types of blockholders, leading to heterogeneity
within the group of foundation-owned firms. In addition to these con-
tributions to the academic literature, the results of our study have im-
plications for family firm practitioners by highlighting the effectiveness
of family foundations and the potential benefits of family involvement
for firm performance.
2. Research context: foundation-owned firms
A foundation is a legally independent institution that owns assets
donated by the founder of the foundation and is set up for a certain
(charitable and/or private) purpose. The assets of the foundation can be
funds, real estate or (as with our study) the equity shares of a firm.
Foundations are an important type of institution, as, for instance, the
numbers for Germany show: According to the Federal Association of
German Foundations, currently, more than 22,000 foundations exist in
Germany.2 Approximately 500 new foundations are currently estab-
lished per year, of which 95 percent serve charitable purposes. Most
founders of foundations are individuals, but firms and the state may
also act as founders and establish foundations.
Foundation-owned firms are firms that are partly or fully owned by
foundations (Herrmann & Franke, 2002; Thomsen, 2012).3 In the lit-
erature, various qualitative and quantitative criteria are used to define
foundation-owned firms. One of the pioneers of this field of study,
Stickrodt (1960), defines a foundation-owned firm as a firm for which a
foundation owns 100 percent of firm equity. Thomsen (1996; 1999)
relaxes this restrictive assumption and uses a 50 percent threshold to
distinguish foundation-owned firms from other types of firms.
Herrmann and Franke (2002) go even a step further and consider it
sufficient if a foundation is among the firm owners, regardless of how
large its specific ownership stake is. Fleschutz (2009), in turn, does not
use firm equity as a defining criterion but instead refers to the influence
that the foundation has on the firm. Fig. 1 below shows the typical
structure of a foundation-owned firm in Germany (for a detailed
overview, please refer to Moog & Schell, 2015).
2 See https://www.stiftungen.org/stiftungen/zahlen-und-daten/statistiken.
html (accessed June 7, 2019).
3 In the German language, the terms “Stiftungsunternehmen” and “stif-
tungsverbundenes Unternehmen” are used for foundation-owned firms. The
corresponding foundations are referred to as “unternehmensbezogene Stiftung”,
“unternehmensnahe Stiftung”, “Unternehmensstiftung”,
“Unternehmensträgerstiftung”, “gewerbliche Stiftung”, and “un-
ternehmensverbundene Stiftung”. In some international publications, the term
“industrial foundations” is used (Thomsen, 2017).
J. Block, et al. Journal of Family Business Strategy xxx (xxxx) xxxx
2
2.1. Establishment of a foundation and types of foundations
Setting up a foundation differs from setting up a firm in terms of the
process as well as the implications. In the following, we elaborate on
the specific processes and decisions related to foundations in the
German legal system. Notably, whoever transfers assets into a founda-
tion irreversibly disposes of his or her assets and forgoes any ownership
claims. Moreover, the foundation is obliged to invest the donated assets
in a risk-averse and profitable manner to maintain the foundation’s
capital. A foundation is intended to last in perpetuity and usually
cannot be dissolved.4 For the establishment of a foundation, there are
only a few requirements to be fulfilled (Fricke, 2010): the founder of the
foundation has to establish the “foundation business”, and the re-
sponsible authority of the respective federal state (“Stiftungsaufsicht”)
has to approve the foundation. The foundation business (“Stiftungs-
geschäft”) is based on a unilateral declaration of intent (Götz & Berndt,
2009), which contains the foundation charter (“Stiftungssatzung”) and
the founder’s binding declaration to donate assets to the foundation to
fulfill the purpose specified in the charter. The charter, which is the
heart of the foundation (Heinzelmann, 2002), is generally binding and
difficult to change after the founder’s death. In the case of a family
foundation, the charter usually codifies the role of the founding family
in the foundation and describes its rights and duties regarding the
foundation and the firm. Therefore, the foundation charter shares some
similarities with a family constitution, which is an important part of
family governance (Suess, 2014) and aims to reduce the likelihood of
the occurrence of family conflicts with potentially detrimental con-
sequences (Arteaga & Menéndez-Requejo, 2017; Frank et al., 2011).
The charter contains the name, registered office, purpose, assets, and
organization of the foundation.
The purpose of the foundation (“Stiftungszweck”) is often described
as the most important aspect of the charter, since it concerns the
foundation’s identity and since its assets as well as its organization are
geared towards the purpose (Heinzelmann, 2002; Kronke, 1988). A
foundation may have several purposes, which can be generally classi-
fied as either a charitable or private nature (Fritsche & Kilian, 2008).
There are basically no limits regarding the purpose of a to-be-installed
foundation; the purpose must be attainable, and it must not endanger
the common good. In addition, a continuous, sustainable fulfillment of
the foundation’s purpose must be guaranteed, which, in contrast to
association or company law, means that it is almost impossible to
change the purpose of the foundation at a later point in time
(Heinzelmann, 2002). In addition to the purpose, the foundation’s
assets (“Stiftungsvermögen”) are an important feature of the foundation
charter. Under German law, there are no requirements or restrictions on
the assets that a foundation could possess (Kronke, 1988). In many
cases, the assets comprise cash, land, securities, and equity. The assets
need to be preserved, and generally, the profits generated from the
foundation’s assets should be distributed to the foundation’s projects
(von Camphausen & Richter, 2014). In addition, the boards of the
foundation have to manage the assets in such a way that the purpose of
the foundation is maintained.
Another important aspect of the charter is the organization of the
foundation, which can be freely determined by the founder. In the
German context, the only legal requirement is the existence of a man-
agement board, regardless of its form and size. As there is no compul-
sory external accounting of foundations (Kennedy et al., 1998) and due
to the fact that the supervisory boards of foundations are voluntary,
foundations are subject to state supervision. This stipulation serves to
protect the foundation from misconduct on the part of the foundation
board and to ensure that the founder’s will regarding the foundation
business is fulfilled (Heinzelmann, 2002).
Foundations are heterogeneous by nature and differ with regard to
their functioning (grant-making versus operational), size, age, and legal
capacity. For the purpose of our study, we distinguish between chari-
table and family foundations, which have different purposes. Charitable
foundations use the returns from their assets to finance charitable pro-
jects, whereas the beneficiaries of family foundations are the families
and their individual members. As the name suggests, a charitable
foundation must serve the common good; its purpose is to achieve
cultural, social, ecological, and scientific goals.5
A family foundation, however, serves private purposes and supports
the founder’s family (Brandmüller & Lindner, 2004). As such, returns
from assets can be freely used by the family members. In other words,
while family members, in the case of family foundations, no longer
possess ownership rights, they still financially benefit from their roles as
beneficiaries. Family and charitable foundations differ not only in their
purpose but also regarding their treatment by the German tax system.6
Since serving the common good has certain privileges under German
tax law, charitable foundations are treated differently than family
foundations, e.g., the latter have to pay an equivalent of an inheritance
tax as well as taxes when there has been an endowment. However, if the
assets are transferred to a charitable foundation either before or
Fig. 1. Structure of a foundation-owned firm in Germany.
Source: own figure
4 The only exception is the consumption foundation (“Verbrauchsstiftung”),
which is created for a limited time period and should consume all its assets to
fulfill the foundation’s purpose.
5 Note that charitable foundations do not need to distribute 100% of their
dividends to charitable projects and are allowed to make small financial pay-
ments to family members.
6 See also Henrekson et al. (2019), who discuss the role of tax incentives for
the creation of private foundations as controlling owners of Swedish listed
firms.
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immediately after death, as defined in the last will, no inheritance tax
has to be paid.
2.2. Foundations as a succession option and their competitive (dis-)
advantages
Why do founders or business-owning families choose this particular
form of succession instead of other forms? The reasons are manifold. In
addition to charitable or philanthropic ambitions, such as promoting
science, regional support, ecological goals, or caring for employees
(Zeiter, 2004), family-related issues may play an important role. The
transfer of equity into a foundation can be an attractive succession
option when no adequate heir is available or in the case of sibling
conflicts (De Massis et al., 2008; Friedman, 1991; Zellweger &
Kammerlander, 2015), as it delegates ownership and leadership tasks to
outsiders while at the same time avoiding selling the firm to external
parties and leaving opportunities for family members to remain con-
nected to the firm. The potential for family conflicts is reduced as dis-
putes over inheritance and succession in these firms can be avoided by a
clear regulation in the foundation charter. This regulation applies not
only to the next generation but also to future generations. Moreover,
setting up a foundation might allow the founder to provide for the fu-
ture care for the family (Block & Hosseini, 2017). The founder’s family
can be continuously provided the resources that they need. In a family
foundation, the family as the beneficiary will continue to profit from
the firm’s dividends. The family charter can precisely regulate which
family members or family tribes benefit from the foundation and in
what form. These benefits can be regular payments or one-off payments
for a specific purpose (e.g., education). Such regulations can also pre-
vent the family members from living a spendthrift lifestyle. Further-
more, by setting up the charter, the founder shapes the foundation for
eternity, far beyond his or her death. For many founders, this continued
influence beyond their death is a key motivation for establishing a
(family) foundation (Sharma et al., 2001).
In addition to these family considerations, founders might establish
foundations due to firm considerations, e.g., because they want to keep
the company independent and avoid (hostile) takeovers (Scholes et al.,
2010). Finally, tax considerations can also be a decisive factor, as
charitable foundations are exempt from inheritance taxes. In addition, a
charitable foundation is usually favorably perceived by the public, thus
enhancing the reputation that may spill over to the family.
From a firm perspective, the most important advantage is that the
firm will no longer be led by short-term driven owners, as there are
typically no majority shareholders who insist on paying out the highest
possible dividend. Therefore, the management of a foundation-owned
firm is relieved of the pressure to achieve short-term optimization to the
detriment of long-term prosperity. This freedom enables foundation-
owned firms to better plan for the long term and gain a competitive
advantage (Draheim, 2016). A further advantage of specifically chari-
table foundations is that they typically enjoy excellent reputations in
society that might spill over to the firm. One advantage of family
foundations as owners is that family members are often still close en-
ough to the firm to potentially be available as advisors or for re-
presentative tasks, thereby providing important human capital to the
firm.
Despite these positive aspects, from the founder perspective, setting
up a foundation-owned firm might also have disadvantages, such as
conflicts within the family. In particular, family members might be
unsatisfied that they are not being considered successors. For example,
the founder of Playmobil, Horst Brandstetter, transferred the shares of
his firm into a foundation because he did not trust his son to be able to
run the firm and out of fear that he would make too many changes to
the firm. Not surprisingly, his son was disappointed with this decision.7
Such dissatisfaction might even be increased in the case of a charitable
foundation, which limits payments to family members. Long-lasting
legal proceedings might follow. From the firm perspective, the main
disadvantage is the potential inability of the firm to react in a flexible
manner to changing technological, political, or economic conditions,
thus becoming slow and uncompetitive (Achleitner et al., 2018). These
problems can be caused by a rather inflexible and restrictive foundation
charter. Moreover, foundation-owned firms might face problems raising
(equity) capital and grow through acquisitions, as the foundation may
not be allowed to sell shares or become a minority owner of the firm
(Achleitner et al., 2018). Another potential disadvantage is that boards,
especially those of charitable foundations, are often staffed with in-
dividuals from a nonprofit background lacking industry expertise or
entrepreneurial and managerial know-how to effectively control man-
agement, which can result in managers acting opportunistically
(Zellweger & Kammerlander, 2015), causing damage to the firm. As a
result, recent research by Draheim and Franke (2018) finds that foun-
dation-owned firms can sometimes be overstaffed and very labor in-
tensive, which they explain by a strong stakeholder orientation, parti-
cularly toward employees and managers. Table 1 below summarizes the
advantages and disadvantages of foundation-owned firms compared to
other firms.
3. Literature review and hypotheses development
3.1. Research on blockholder ownership and its performance effects
Corporate governance research has long been concerned with the
effects of ownership structures and blockholder ownership on firm
strategy and firm performance (Graves & Waddock, 1990; Holderness,
2003). Within this large stream of research, blockholders have received
particular attention. Blockholders are defined as shareholders owning a
substantial share of a company’s stock.8 Foundations as firm owners can
be considered blockholders as they typically own a company either
fully or with a sizeable share. Two broad perspectives exist in the
corporate governance literature on the performance effects of bloc-
kholder ownership. Both perspectives are grounded in agency theory.
The convergence-of-interest hypothesis (De Miguel et al., 2004; Morck
et al., 1988) suggests that blockholder ownership has a positive effect
on firm performance and shareholder value because blockholders as
owners have both a strong incentive as well as the expertise and power
to effectively monitor a firm’s management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
Zeckhauser and Pund, 1990). The entrenchment hypothesis (Morck
et al., 1988), in contrast, suggests a negative effect. According to this
perspective, concentrated ownership may lead to the entrenchment of
blockholders and managers, resulting in the expropriation of minority
shareholders (Morck et al., 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Early stu-
dies on blockholder ownership investigate the performance effects of
concentrated ownership (Agrawal & Mandelker, 1990; Barclay &
Holderness, 1990; Bethel et al., 1998; Holderness, 2003; Holderness &
Sheehan, 1988; Lewellen et al., 1985). Later studies distinguish be-
tween different types of blockholders. Achleitner et al. (2011) and
Renneboog et al. (2007), for example, investigate the shareholder value
effects of private equity ownership in Germany and the UK and find
positive effects. Similar results are obtained for hedge funds as firm
owners (Bessler et al., 2015; Brav et al., 2008). With regard to banks as
blockholders, the findings are mixed. Boehmer (2000) reports that
banks have a positive effect on shareholder value only if there exists a
second blockholder in the firm. The literature regarding families as
7 See https://www.wiwo.de/unternehmen/industrie/playmobil-das-
(footnote continued)
vermeintliche-fuehrungsproblem/13678996-3.html (accessed June 6, 2019).
8 The exact definition of what can be considered ‘substantial’, however, de-
pends on country-specific factors such as the country’s system of corporate
governance.
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blockholders is already very advanced, and several meta-analyses exist
(O’Boyle et al., 2012; Hansen & Block, 2020; Hansen et al., 2020;
Wagner et al., 2015). Family ownership seems to have a statistically
significant but economically small positive effect on firm performance.
However, considerable heterogeneity exists with regard to perfor-
mance, which can be explained by the heterogeneous nature of family
firms and family ownership. Compared to the large body of literature
on family firm performance, only a few studies to date have examined
the performance effects of foundations as firm owners. We briefly re-
view this literature in the next section before we derive our hypotheses
regarding the performance differences within the group of foundation-
owned firms.
3.2. Research on the performance of foundation-owned firms
Prior research has started to investigate the performance of foun-
dation-owned firms. Some studies report a positive effect of foundation
ownership on firm success (e.g., Draheim, 2016; Herrmann & Franke,
2002) due to those firms’ long-term orientation. Similar to families as
owners, foundations have a strong long-term interest in the firm.
Foundations cannot easily sell their equity stakes in the firm because
their foundation charter typically restricts them from doing s. Hence,
foundations are patient firm owners or investors who care about the
long-term development of the firm that they own. Having such a long-
term oriented, patient owner can be a competitive advantage for
foundation-owned firms because it allows them to invest continuously
in innovation and other long-term projects (Harford et al., 2018). Other
studies, however, find negative (e.g., Achleitner et al., 2018) or non-
significant effects (Dzansi, 2012; Thomsen, 1996; Thomsen & Rose,
2004) of foundation ownership on firm performance. These studies
typically take an agency perspective and argue that foundation-owned
firms and foundations as owners suffer from problems concerning the
monitoring of management. The lack of strong, business-oriented
principals might lead to a lack of corporate control and can result in
forgoing entrepreneurial opportunities. Draheim and Franke (2018), for
example, describe foundation-owned firms as firms without powerful
residual claimants, leading to weak corporate governance. Moreover,
foundation-owned firms pursue a strong stakeholder orientation at the
expense of financial performance, which might result from a lack of
corporate control by strong, knowledgeable shareholders. Stakeholders,
such as the firm’s employees or management, fill the void and pursue
their own interests at the expense of the firm’s interests and profit-
ability. In line with this argumentation, prior research shows that
foundation-owned firms are sometimes overstaffed and pay above-
average wages (Børsting and Thomsen, 2017; Draheim & Franke,
2018).
To summarize, there is mixed evidence about the performance of
foundation-owned firms compared to other firms. We argue that prior
research has so far failed to capture the full heterogeneity that exists
within the group of foundation-owned firms. Indeed, most prior re-
search has treated foundation-owned firms as a homogenous group and
has compared the performance of foundation-owned firms against the
performance of other types of firms. To date, little is known about the
performance differences within the group of foundation-owned firms.
Our study aims to close this important gap.
3.3. Performance differences within the group of foundation-owned firms
In this section, we develop three hypotheses about performance
differences within the group of foundation-owned firms. Similar to most
prior research on blockholder ownership, we use agency theory as the
theoretical framework. In particular, we distinguish between the in-
terest alignment (De Miguel et al., 2004; Morck et al., 1988) and en-
trenchment effects (Morck et al., 1988) of blockholder ownership.
Hypothesis 1 concerns the differences in the performance effects of
charitable versus family foundations as firm owners. Hypothesis 2 re-
fers to the differences between listed and non-listed (i.e., privately held)
foundation-owned firms. Finally, Hypothesis 3 addresses the differences
between foundation-owned firms in which the founding family is in-
volved in the firm and foundation-owned firms in which this is not the
case.
3.3.1. Charitable foundations versus family foundations and the
performance of foundation-owned firms
In alignment with our discussion about the differences between
charitable and family foundations in Section 2.1 above, we argue that
compared to family foundations, charitable foundations have more
difficulty with and are less efficient in monitoring the management of
the foundation-owned firm. Hence, from an agency theory perspective,
the interest alignment between the shareholders of the firm (i.e., the
foundation) and managers of the firm should be lower for charitable
foundations than family foundations. This lack of interest alignment in
firms owned by charitable foundations might negatively affect ac-
counting performance.
A charitable foundation uses the dividends it receives from the firm
for charitable purposes, as defined in the foundation charter. Taking the
agency perspective, this implies that the final beneficiaries of the di-
vidends have no control or voting rights to influence the decisions of
the foundation or the foundation-owned firm. While this is in strong
contrast to other firm owners who are typically individuals with re-
sidual claims and control rights (Thomsen, 1999) in general, we argue
that charitable foundations face greater difficulties than family
Table 1
Advantages and disadvantages of foundation-owned firms.
Advantages Disadvantages
Perspective of the founder or founding family
• Structure and scope of the firm is kept according to the wishes of the founder.• Family conflicts over succession can be avoided or reduced.• Future family generations can receive a stable income through dividends
(through the family foundation).
• No or reduced inheritance tax (applies only to charitable foundations).• Solution to ownership succession if no heir is available.
Perspective of the founder or founding family:
• Family members may feel upset as the founder seems not to have trust in their
competence as owners and/or managers.
• Formulating the foundation charter may be difficult and challenging.
Perspective of the firm
• Foundations are patient and long-term oriented shareholder.• Foundations do not seek to maximize dividend payments allowing the firm to
invest into R&D and other long-term projects.
• Positive reputation spillovers of being a foundation-owned firm can create a
positive image for employees and customers (applies mostly to charitable
foundations).
Perspective of the firm
• Reduced flexibility of the firm to raise additional equity from capital markets.• Strict boundaries defined in the foundation charter reduce the firm’s ability to acquire and
divest business units.
• Foundations may not have the competence and expertise to effectively control the
management of the foundation-owned firm which can lead to opportunistic behavior
(applies particularly to charitable foundations).
• The concept, functioning, and structure is mostly unknown outside the DACH region
which can lead to misunderstandings and communication problems.
• Due to strong employee orientation foundation-owned firms are sometimes overstaffed.
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foundations in monitoring the firm’s management. The reason is that
charitable foundations typically employ and are managed by in-
dividuals with a professional background in the social or charitable
sector (Maier et al., 2016; Suarez, 2010), who often lack the expertise
needed to effectively monitor the firm’s management. This allows
management to act opportunistically at the expense of the firms’ de-
velopment and profitability. Family foundations, in contrast, are fre-
quently managed and governed by descendants of the firm’s founder.
We argue that the family members in family foundations who monitor
the firm’s management possess the capability and motivation to do so
because of family tradition, existing industry or management expertise,
and, most importantly, the fact that they receive dividends. A model by
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) shows that boards with greater monitoring
incentives have a positive effect on firm performance. These arguments
lead us to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Foundation-owned firms owned by a family foundation
have better accounting performance than foundation-owned firms
owned by a charitable foundation.
3.3.2. Stock market listing and the performance of foundation-owned firms
Like any other type of firm, foundation-owned firms can be listed on
the stock market. From the agency theory perspective, a stock market
listing is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can lead to better
monitoring or disciplining of management (Holmström & Tirole, 1993;
Pagano et al., 1998; Pagano & Röell, 1998). Firms that are listed on
stock markets are under greater public scrutiny and are constantly
monitored by financial analysts. This puts pressure on management to
make decisions leading to strong (accounting and market-related) firm
performance. In this way, the stock market might compensate for the
lack of effective control by an incompetent and ineffective foundation
(Achleitner et al., 2018). All of these stock market-related benefits can
help the firm grow and develop and lead to better firm performance.
On the other hand, the strong stock market-induced performance
expectations regarding the firm’s management can also have dis-
advantages such as stock-market myopia (Abarbanell & Bernard, 2000;
Laverty, 1996; Marginson & McAulay, 2008). From the agency theory
perspective, stock-market myopia can occur because it is easier to
measure short-term performance than long-term performance. Hence,
to meet the expectations of the stock market, managers have a strong
incentive to focus on short-term rather than long-term performance and
to engage in short-termism, which can manifest itself in decreased in-
vestments in R&D and innovation (Bushee, 1998; Chen et al., 2015),
endangering the firm’s competitive position and future performance
(Brauer, 2013). The reason for this short-termism is that the funds
supplied via the stock market often come from impatient investors, such
as investment or hedge funds. These investors can move their funds
more quickly than other investors and therefore do not understand – or
care about – the firm’s long-term prospects (Bushee, 1998). Managers
know about this investor behavior and are forced to think in the short
term to avoid the risk of a firm takeover (Stein, 1988) or the loss of their
jobs (Palley, 1997). Additionally, quarterly reporting is a characteristic
of stock markets that can induce short-term managerial behavior (Stein,
1989).
Despite such potential drawbacks, however, we argue that, for the
case of foundation-owned firms, the benefits of a stock market listing
outweigh the disadvantages. Foundations are powerful blockholders
and, almost by definition, patient and long-term investors. Recent re-
search by Harford et al. (2018) shows that long-term investors improve
corporate governance and reduce managerial misbehavior such as
earnings management and financial fraud. In addition, long-term in-
vestors have positive effects on innovation quality and quantity as well
as firm profitability. In short, our argument is that the danger of stock
market or managerial myopia is lower in foundation-owned firms than
in other types of stock market listed firms, leading to an emphasis on
the benefits that accompany stock market listings. These arguments
bring us to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Listed foundation-owned firms have better accounting
performance than non-listed foundation-owned firms.
3.3.3. Family involvement in the firm and the performance of foundation-
owned firms
Prior research shows that the performance effects of family in-
volvement vary strongly and depend on contextual factors (Miller et al.,
2013; Wagner et al., 2015). Family management, for example, can have
both positive and negative impacts on firm performance. These out-
comes can be explained from the agency theory perspective. On the
positive side, members of the founding family grew up with the firm
and often have substantial knowledge of the firm and its processes
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). Moreover, their family role may fa-
cilitate intergenerational knowledge transfer and knowledge manage-
ment (Jaskiewicz et al., 2013). Finally, the family members often
identify strongly with the firm, have high intrinsic motivation, and can
act as effective agents motivating employees and other stakeholders of
the firm (Davis et al., 2010; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). There is a
strong incentive alignment between the interests of the firm and the
family members. This alignment reduces agency costs and can have
performance advantages. On the negative side, there can be problems of
entrenchment and nepotism, where a family member may act oppor-
tunistically and use the firm’s resources for his or her personal activities
(Bandiera et al., 2017) or help the business-owning family exploit
nonfamily shareholders (Morck et al., 2005; Volpin, 2002). Second, as
the pool of suitable family members is limited, management or control
positions might be filled with family members who do not have suffi-
cient talent, expertise, and management know-how (Bennedsen et al.,
2007). Employing incompetent and untalented family managers can
further increase the agency costs related to entrenchment.
We argue that foundations as owners reduce the likelihood of in-
competent or opportunistic family members being involved in the firm.
In fact, a common motive for founders to transfer their equity to a
foundation is to protect the firm from mismanagement by his or her
own family (De Massis et al., 2008; Friedman, 1991). Therefore,
foundation-owned firms most likely employ only members of the
founding family who have sufficient entrepreneurial and managerial
know-how to successfully manage and/or control the firm. Next, with
the transfer of ownership to the foundation, the founding family re-
duces its influence on the firm, making it harder to nominate (in-
competent) family members for the firm’s management and/or super-
visory boards. As described above, the foundation is a self-governing
institution that has to follow the foundation charter rather than the
family’s interests. Due to the mitigation of the negative factors, we posit
that for foundation-owned firms, the positive aspects of family in-
volvement outweigh the negative aspects. In other words, the reduction
in agency costs related to strong interest alignment outweighs the ad-
ditional agency costs that can occur due to entrenchment. This leads us
to our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Foundation-owned firms in which the founding family is
involved in the firm have better accounting performance than other
foundation-owned firms.
4. Data and method
4.1. Sample and data sources
The focus of our study is on German foundation-owned firms. Aside
from Germany, foundation-owned firms are also common in many
European countries, such as Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Scandinavian countries. In the U.S.,
foundation-owned firms do not play a substantial role to date, as
foundations or trusts are not allowed to own more than 20 percent of a
J. Block, et al. Journal of Family Business Strategy xxx (xxxx) xxxx
6
firm’s equity (Fleishman, 2003).
During data collection, we identified 372 foundation-owned firms in
Germany. We started with a list of German foundation-owned firms
generated from Fleschutz (2009) and Besecke (2015) and extended this
list with the help of data from the Federal Financial Supervisory Au-
thority (BAFIN) and other databases, such as Hoppenstedt and Ama-
deus. As many of the identified 372 foundation-owned firms are ex-
cluded from the disclosure obligation (less than 12 million € turnover or
less than 250 employees), they do not have to publish their income
statements. Thus, accounting data were available for 136 foundation-
owned firms for the period of 2006–2016.
We used the Amadeus database to collect the accounting data of
these firms. Subsequently, additional data were collected manually
from the German Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger). In addition to the
accounting data, we collected information on the firms’ ownership
structures using the Hoppenstedt database. We used the NACE Rev.2
codes for industrial classification. Table 2 provides an overview of our
variables, and Table 3 provides an overview of our sample.
Among the 136 foundation-owned firms in our sample, 30 firms are
(partly) owned by a family foundation, 106 firms are (partly) owned by
a charitable foundation, 23 firms are listed on a stock exchange, and 28
firms have family involvement in management. The mean ownership
share of the foundation in the foundation-owned firm is 64.3 %. By
industry classification, manufacturing accounts for 36 % and retail
accounts for 31 % of the firms in our sample. The firms in our sample
are relatively large and old. The mean age is 67 years, and the mean
number of employees is 13,496.
4.2. Empirical analyses
To test our hypotheses, we use a linear regression for four different
performance measures.
4.2.1. Dependent variables
The dependent variables are Return on Sales (ROS), Return on
Investments (ROI), and Return on Assets (ROA). These three variables are
chosen because they are the most common profitability indicators used
to assess firm accounting performance. We based our selection of
variables on previous studies that have examined the accounting per-
formance of foundation-owned firms (Draheim & Franke, 2018;
Herrmann & Franke, 2002; Thomsen, 1996) and family firms (Andres,
2008). Using the Amadeus database, we collected data for the period






RoS Average return on sales (2006−2016)*
RoI Average return on investment (2006−2016)*
RoA Average return on assets (2006−2016)*
Independent variables
Charitable foundation Dummy for whether the foundation is a charitable or a family foundation ***
Listed firm Dummy for whether the firm is listed on the stock exchange or not ***
Family involvement Dummy for whether the (founding) family is involved in the management or supervisory board *
Control variables
Percentage of foundation ownership Percentage of firm ownership held by the foundation **
Firm size Average number of employees (log) (2006−2016) *
Sales growth Average sales growth between 2006 and 2016 *
Debt-equity-ratio Total liabilities divided by total equity *
Firm age Age of the firm in years **
Industry categories
Professional, scientific and technical activities Dummy for firms active in professional, scientific and technical activities *
Manufacturing Dummy for firms active in manufacturing *
Retail Dummy for firms active in wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles *





Descriptive statistics and correlations.
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 VIF
1. ROS 5.07 0.67
2. ROI 4.48 0.50 0.68
3. ROA 6.36 0.53 0.56 0.94
4. Charitable foundation 0.71 −0.21 −0.14 −0.14 1.04
5. Listed firm 0.19 −0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 1.26
6. Family involvement 0.26 0.13 0.27 0.26 0.02 0.02 1.17
7. Manufacturing 0.36 −0.11 −0.09 −0.08 −0.01 0.12 −0.07 1.34
8. Retail 0.31 −0.12 −0.05 −0.06 0.01 −0.08 0.01 −0.19 1.17
9. Other industries 0.10 0.07 −0.06 −0.08 −0.00 −0.03 0.01 −0.33 −0.16 1.39
10. Percentage of foundation ownership 64.27 3.29 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.00 −0.35 0.10 0.01 −0.13 0.08 1.25
11. Firm size 3.19 0.08 −0.00 0.17 0.21 0.12 0.22 0.31 0.08 −0.05 −0.24 −0.05 1.26
12. Sales growth 31.73 4.77 0.35 0.31 0.33 0.08 −0.08 0.01 −0.10 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.12 1.14
13. Debt-equity-ratio 125.52 9.85 −0.28 −0.29 −0.35 0.07 −0.05 0.01 −0.06 0.04 −0.08 −0.10 0.03 −0.09 1.05
14. Firm age 67.73 3.81 −0.03 −0.05 −0.00 −0.00 −0.20 −0.11 −0.06 0.01 0.09 −0.11 −0.04 0.19 0.01 1.10
Coefficients with an absolute value larger than 0.05 are significant at 5 percent level and are highlighted in bold.
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4.2.2. Independent and control variables
The main goal of this study is to determine how the heterogeneous
group of foundation-owned firms differs in terms of performance. For
this purpose, three dummy variables are created to capture the in-
dependent variables. The variable charitable foundation indicates whe-
ther the firm has a charitable or a family foundation as a shareholder.9
The influence of a stock exchange listing on performance is tested by
the variable listed foundation-owned firm. To create this variable, we
checked the Hoppenstedt database to determine whether each firm is
listed on the stock exchange. The variable family involvement indicates
whether the founding family is involved in the management board or
supervisory board of the firm. This information was obtained through
the Amadeus database. We also checked whether there were changes in
the involvement of the family in the firm between 2006 and 2016, but
we did not observe any such changes.
In addition, we collected information on control variables. The
variables firm size (average number of employees (log) (2006−2016))
and firm age (in years) are used to control for effects related to the size
or the life cycle of the firm. We use industry dummies to control for
different industries based on NACE Rev.2 codes for industrial classifi-
cation. Three industries are frequently represented in our sample and
are covered by the variables professional/scientific/technical activities,
manufacturing, and retail (wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor
vehicles and motorcycles). Other industries is a variable used to indicate
firms active in industries that do not occur more than four times in our
sample. To control for the ownership structure and the influence of the
foundation on the firm, we included the variable percentage of founda-
tion ownership (number of shares held by the foundation as a percentage
of total equity). The variable debt-equity-ratio is used to control for the
effects relating to the firm’s capital structure. Finally, the variable sales
growth (average sales growth between 2006 and 2016) is used to control
for firms that follow an aggressive growth strategy. The correlations
and descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3.
The correlation table shows only a few significant correlations be-
tween the independent variables. In addition to the correlations, we
also calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs). The results show that
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a concern for our study. The average
VIF is 1.20, and the maximum VIF is 1.39 (variable other industries).
5. Results
The results of the linear regressions are reported in Table 4 and
show that firms owned by a family foundation perform better than
firms owned by a charitable foundation. These results apply to all three
performance measures: ROS, ROI, and ROA. Thus, we find strong sup-
port for Hypothesis 1. The accounting performance of foundation-
owned firms listed on the stock exchange is not significantly different
from the performance of nonlisted firms. Hence, we find no support for
Hypothesis 2. We observe a positive effect of family involvement on the
accounting performance of foundation-owned firms. The respective
coefficient is positive and statistically significant with regard to ROI
and ROA. No effect is found with regard to ROS. Hence, we find partial
support for Hypothesis 3. The magnitude of the detected effects is
economically important. The average ROA of firms owned by family
foundations is 3.03 percentage points higher than that of firms owned
by a charitable foundation; the involvement of the family in the foun-
dation-owned firm increases the firm’s ROA by 2.49 percentage points.
With regard to the control variables, the results show a statistically
significant negative effect of the debt-equity ratio; sales growth has a
significant, positive influence. The variables firm age, firm size and
percentage of foundation ownership do not have statistically significant
effects on the performance of foundation-owned firms.
6. Discussion
6.1. Summary of the main results
We use a hand-collected, rich dataset of foundation-owned firms to
shed light on the heterogeneity of these firms. As such, our phenom-
enon-driven paper is among the first to analyze how foundation-owned
firms differ from each other and sheds light on the heterogeneity of
foundation-owned firms. In line with our theoretical arguments, the
analyses show that firms owned by family foundations outperform firms
owned by charitable foundations. However, contrary to our expecta-
tions, a stock market listing does not result in increased performance.
Interestingly, and in contrast to some prior family firm research
(Bennedsen et al., 2007; Morck et al., 2005), the direct involvement of
family members in the firm increases the performance of foundation-
owned firms. Our main findings are linked to different literature
streams, which we describe in detail below.
6.2. Implications for research about family businesses and foundation-
owned firms
As many foundations are family foundations or charitable founda-
tions in which family members are engaged, our study adds to the fa-
mily business literature. Furthermore, most foundations originate due
to the succession decision regarding a family-owned firm. Therefore,
research on family businesses and foundation-owned firms are strongly
related.
Among the group of foundation-owned firms, involvement of the
founding family in the firm seems to have a positive effect on firm
performance. This result is in contrast to that of many studies in the
family firm literature reporting negative or nonsignificant performance
effects of family involvement (Basco, 2013; Bennedsen et al., 2007;
Sciascia et al., 2014; Wagner et al., 2015). With this result, we con-
tribute to a more nuanced view about the performance effects of family
involvement (Miller et al., 2013). It seems that powerful foundations as
firm owners can act as a barrier to incompetent family members being
involved in the firm, and only the positive aspects of family involve-
ment prevail for foundation-owned firms. In addition to contributing to
the family firm literature, our study contributes to research about
foundations as firm owners (Draheim, 2016; Fleisch et al., 2018,
Fleschutz, 2009), particularly the literature on the performance im-
plications of foundation ownership (Dzansi, 2012; Herrmann & Franke,
2002; Thomsen, 1996; Thomsen & Rose, 2004). As was already noted in
our introduction, thus far, little is known about performance differences
within the group of foundation-owned firms. Our study shows that fa-
mily-related factors, such as having a family foundation or family in-
volvement in the firm, are important drivers of performance differ-
ences. Through our findings, our study connects the emerging research
stream about the behavior and performance of foundation-owned firms
with the family firm literature.
The results of our analysis show that firms owned by family foun-
dations outperform firms owned by charitable foundations. These re-
sults are in line with our theoretical arguments that charitable foun-
dations may lack the managerial know-how needed to effectively
monitor and control the firm’s management (Achleitner et al., 2018;
Maier et al., 2016; Suarez, 2010). The charitable foundation part of our
study relates to research about philanthropy in family firms (e.g.,
Campopiano et al., 2014; Feliu & Botero, 2016). Foundations are an
important vehicle for business families and their family firms to prac-
tice philanthropy. However, typically, these foundations do not own
equity or act as firm owners, which makes the phenomenon and study
of foundation-owned firms very insightful and special. By transferring
equity into a charitable foundation, the business owner clearly shows “a
manifestation of a voluntary commitment to the well-being of others”
9 The sample does not contain any firm that is owned by both a charitable and
a family foundation (also known as “Doppelstiftung”). See Moog and Schell
(2015) for more details.
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(Feliu & Botero, 2016, p. 121), qualifying as philanthropic activity
(Schuyt, 2010). Nevertheless, philanthropy is unlikely to be the only
motivation for transferring firm equity to a charitable foundation, as
there are many other ways (potentially less complicated) that business
owners can help society. For example, he or she might simply sell the
firm and donate the proceeds to a good cause. As discussed above,
setting up a foundation-owned firm can also help solve family succes-
sion issues, reduce the impact of inheritance taxes, and secure the long-
run existence of the firm. Thus, the motives are manifold and comprise
many business- and family-related motives as well as philanthropic
motives, which is in line with prior research about the philanthropy and
social responsibility of family firms (Binz et al., 2013; Cruz et al., 2014;
Dou et al., 2014; Feliu & Botero, 2016).
From the firm perspective, our results point towards an important
trade-off. While a charitable foundation as a firm owner may be good
for society, it seems not to be beneficial for firm performance.
Foundation-owned firms with charitable foundations as owners show
weaker accounting performance than other foundation-owned firms.
Having a stock market listing does not seem to compensate for this
negative performance effect, as one might have expected.
6.3. Implications for corporate governance research
Our study also has implications for the field of corporate govern-
ance. First and foremost, it is surprising that our results do not show any
performance effect of being listed on the stock market. One possible
reason could be that since foundations are large and powerful bloc-
kholders, the stock market-induced effects are outweighed by bloc-
kholder effects (Gigler et al., 2014).
As already noted in the introduction, the corporate governance lit-
erature widely discusses ownership effects. The influential role of
shareholders can be explained by the shareholder primacy view, which
prioritizes shareholders over all company stakeholders and thus con-
siders them the most important group in terms of profit maximization
(Berle & Means, 1991). Accordingly, agency theory states that share-
holder protection is the most prevalent aspect of the corporate gov-
ernance relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Blockholders are seen
from two angles in this regard. Blockholders can lead to a convergence
of interest (De Miguel et al., 2004), which implies that they have a
positive effect on performance, as they decrease agency conflicts by
effectively monitoring management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). How-
ever, blockholders could also expropriate other (minority) shareholders
by using their power to optimize their own interest (Shleifer & Vishny,
1997). Furthermore, high ownership concentration is associated with
ineffectiveness in regard to decision making and value maximization
(for a good overview of a discussion on this topic, see Sánchez-Ballesta
& García-Meca, 2007). Both views need to take into account the het-
erogeneity of ownership and blockholder ownership. According to
McNulty and Nordberg (2016), ownership can be seen from different
angles, including the views of “law, psychology, sociology, and orga-
nizational studies” (p. 347). Our study sheds light on the influence of
foundations as blockholders in different contexts as well as with dif-
fering characteristics. Thus, we support the view that a more differ-
entiated analysis of shareholders is needed to disentangle the factors
that affect performance. As we see a negative influence of charitable
foundation ownership on all performance measures, we support the
view that a less knowledgeable and probably less monitoring bloc-
kholder has a negative impact on performance. For family foundation-
owned firms, we can disentangle the effect of the families also involved
in firm management, which has a positive impact on performance; the
results for this case are in line with an incentivized monitoring and
reduced agency-conflict hypothesis, confirming the convergence-of-in-
terest theory. We encourage further research on the interrelation be-
tween the foundation and management, which should help us under-
stand the psychological and organizational aspects of corporate
governance issues.
A second interesting stream of the corporate governance literature
highlights the difference between public and private companies. One
advantage of being publicly listed is the easy transfer of ownership.
Thus, changes in shareholders are rather normal for listed companies.
The types of shareholders that trade frequently will not have a strong
interest in the long-term development of the firm, while those share-
holders interested in a long-term relationship will be more patient and
supportive of long-term oriented actions. Meanwhile, private firms
regularly show strong ownership concentration due to the inefficiencies
of tradable shares. Prior research shows that management is more
strongly monitored in private firms with a large number of shareholders
(Cornelli et al., 2013) than in public firms with dispersed ownership.
However, for listed foundation-owned firms, the foundation is a strong
blockholder. Furthermore, foundations should have a strong incentive
for monitoring the actions of management, or at least clear direction
provided by the foundation charter. This incentive is discussed in re-
search on family and private equity firm ownership (Maury & Pajuste,
2005) and is expected to result in better performance. As we cannot find
performance differences in our sample, we shed light on the role of
influencing blockholders in public versus private firms, showing that
Table 4
Results of linear regressions on the performance of foundation-owned firms.
ROS ROI ROA
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
H1 Charitable foundation −4.818*** (1.275) −3.168*** (0.857) −3.031** (1.221)
H2 Listed firm 1.842 (1.502) 0.857 (0.824) 0.630 (1.461)
H3 Family involvement −0.037 (1.349) 1.267* (0.740) 2.487* (1.304)
Percentage of foundation ownership 0.525 (1.254) 0.868 (1.291) 0.076 (0.711) 0.105 (0.709) 0.359 (1.177) 0.313 (1.236)
Firm size −0.741 (0.586) −0.652 (0.594) 0.435 (0.333) 0.339 (0.327) 1.028* (0.547) 0.819 (0.571)
Sales growth 0.042*** (0.010) 0.047*** (0.009) 0.023*** (0.005) 0.025*** (0.005) 0.027*** (0.009) 0.028*** (0.009)
Debt-equity-ratio −0.012*** (0.004) −0.011*** (0.004) −0.009*** (0.002) −0.009*** (0.002) −0.014*** (0.004) −0.013*** (0.004)
Firm age 0.0004 (0.012) 0.007 (0.012) −0.006 (0.007) −0.003 (0.006) −0.002 (0.011) −0.0008 (0.011)
Manufacturing −0.431 (1.488) −0.646 (1.426) 0.833 (0.843) 0.716+ (0.783) 2.019 (1.402) 2.000 (1.370)
Retail −1.601 (1.512) −2.197 (1.455) −0.127 (0.864) −0.329 (0.804) 0.058 (1.417) 0.058 (1.389)
Other industries −2.339 (2.035) −3.152 (1.972) 2.037* (1.152) 1.470 (1.082) 2.320 (1.936) 1.837 (1.909)
F-Test 4.90*** 5.29*** 5.85*** 7.15*** 4.14*** 4.09***
R² 0.24 0.33 0.28 0.40 0.21 0.27
Adjusted R² 0.19 0.27 0.23 0.34 0.16 0.20
N firms 131 131 130 130 136 136
*** p< 0.01.
** p< 0.05.
* p<0.1 (two-sided tests).
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the market monitoring of a private firm with a foundation as a strong
blockholder does not work less efficiently than in public firms with the
same blockholder type.
6.4. Implications for practice
The results of our study are not only relevant for academic research
but also have practical implications, particularly for founders or
founding families that consider transferring their equity to a founda-
tion. Our results indicate that the family still plays an important role in
foundation-owned firms. Keeping the family involved in the firm
through a position in the firm’s management or supervisory board or as
the ultimate beneficiaries of the foundation seems to be beneficial for
the firm and seems to have positive effects on firm performance. In
contrast, the listing of foundation-owned firms on the stock market
apparently does not have a performance-enhancing effect. When es-
tablishing a foundation as a solution to family business succession,
founders or founding families need to think carefully about who takes
on the role of active owners or entrepreneurs constantly monitoring and
challenging the management of the firm. Our results indicate that the
family can do this job relatively well, while being listed on the stock
market seems not to make a difference. Establishing a foundation can
create a difficult or even paradoxical situation. On the one hand, the
motivation of the founders or founding families to transfer their equity
to a foundation could be to reduce family influence on the firm; on the
other hand, it appears to be just this link or influence that is beneficial
for the foundation-owned firm. However, one needs to note that our
results have to be interpreted with great caution as we did not account
for selection effects (see also a discussion of the limitations below).
Clearly, more research is needed about the precise circumstances and
boundary conditions under which family involvement in foundation-
owned firms creates economic value.
7. Limitations and future research
Our study suffers from three main limitations. First, our analyses
rely on a relatively small sample size because the number of founda-
tion-owned firms in Germany is still limited and because many foun-
dation-owned firms do not publish their accounting data. The research
on foundation-owned firms is still relatively scarce, although this will
likely change in the future since the practical interest in foundations as
firm owners is growing steadily. Second, we cannot distinguish between
the selection and treatment effects in our study. This means, for ex-
ample, that we cannot distinguish whether the owners of poorer per-
forming firms are particularly likely to choose a charitable foundation
as a succession vehicle or whether the charitable foundation is the in-
stitution that causes poorer firm performance. Similarly, it might be
only the highly competent and highly motivated family members who
choose to work in a foundation-owned firm. Again, we cannot distin-
guish whether this selection or the positive influence of the foundation
creates the performance-enhancing effect attributed to family involve-
ment. Finally, given the stability of foundation status over time, we
were not able to run panel analyses. Fellow scholars might build on
research designs such as event studies to scrutinize firm performance
before and after a foundation has been established.
Our study opens up several avenues for further research. First, one
could try to gain a deeper understanding of the family involvement
effects. In our analysis, we could not distinguish between family in-
volvement in the management board or supervisory board. It would be
interesting to learn whether the positive effects of family involvement
are due to effective management control or due to effective (opera-
tional) management or both. Second, it would be interesting to re-
plicate our study with firms from different countries and regions. In
particular, Scandinavia would be a good choice, as it has a similar
structure in terms of foundation-owned firms (Thomsen, 1996, 1999;
Thomsen & Rose, 2004). Third, it would be interesting to relate the
precise reasons the owner decided to transfer his or her equity to the
foundation with the later performance of the foundation-owned firm.
One could expect a legacy or imprinting effect (Burton & Beckman,
2007; Jaskiewicz et al., 2015; Kammerlander et al., 2015) in that the
will or rationale of the founder to set up the foundation is imprinted on
the firm and influences subsequent firm performance. Finally, differ-
ences within the group of foundation-owned firms may exist not only
regarding performance but also regarding other firm outcomes. For
example, one could expect charitable foundations as firm owners to
influence the firm in such a way that the firm behaves in a more socially
responsible and employee-friendly manner (Draheim & Franke, 2018)
than other types of foundation-owned firms. It would also be interesting
to move beyond the firm perspective and to further scrutinize the
philanthropic activities of charitable foundations that own firms. One
could, for example, investigate how philanthropic activities of these
charitable foundations would compare to those of other charitable
foundations that do not own firms.
To summarize, research about foundation-owned firms and their
interrelationships with business families is only beginning to draw
scholarly attention. Clearly, more research is needed to gain a more
comprehensive picture of the heterogeneity of foundation-owned firms
and how this heterogeneity affects firm outcomes. Future research
should also try to integrate and make more (explicit) use of theory in
the study of foundation-owned firms. To date, most studies on foun-
dation-owned firms (including ours) are phenomenon-driven and rather
exploratory and descriptive in nature. As the study of foundation-
owned firms is at the intersection of several academic disciplines and
research streams, multiple theories from different angles could be used.
We hope that our study inspires family firm researchers to conduct
research on this highly relevant and at the same time fascinating phe-
nomenon.
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